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Accounting and social conflict: Profit and regulated working time in the British 
Industrial Revolution1  
 
ABSTRACT 
We demonstrate that social movements can use accounting for progressive purposes, 
and that such outcomes can be promoted where they are aligned with the material 
interests of key fractions of capital. Such fractionalization is a function of technology 
and labour process, underpinned by adopted ideology. Alignment with social 
movement objectives overcomes the class belongingness of accounting that limits its 
progressive role in normal circumstances. We illustrate the role of accounting in 
achieving limitations to working hours and child labour, drawing on accounting 
evidence used to resist and support factory reform during the industrial revolution. 
We compare the evidence on costs and profits presented by both sides in 
parliamentary hearings and also with data revealed from the business accounts of the 
main protagonists. These comparisons show that assumptions about cost behaviour 
were used to exaggerate or mitigate the apparent effects of reduced working time on 
profits.  Regressive fractions of capital were unable to resist change because they 
                                                        
1
 We are grateful to participants at seminars and conference procedings for helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this paper held at University of Exeter Business 
School, November 2013, The Economic and Business History Society Conference, 
Manchester, May, 2014 and the Association of Business Historians Conference, 
Newcastle, June, 2014. The paper has also benefited from constructive criticism and 
helpful suggestions from the associate editor, Judy Brown, and two anonymous 
reviewers. 
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failed to consistently monopolize accounting information to impose a dominant 
narrative about the consequences of regulation. 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent critical accounting literature has offered differing interpretations of the class-
bound nature of accounting information. Using a series of historical cases, Gallhofer 
and Haslam (2003, 2006, 2009) suggest an underlying neutrality of accounting 
information that can be appropriated to further the agendas of social movements. 
Catchpowle and Smyth (2016: p.221) argue instead that accounting information is not 
neutral and has DSDUWLFXODUµFODVVEHORQJLQJQHVV¶ They also note (2016:  p.221) that 
although critical accountants have investigated bad corporate behaviour as a discourse 
in annual reports (Neimark, 1992) and highlighted how creative accounting, tax 
evasion, exploitation and similar behaviour by corporations has been assisted by the 
DFFRXQWDQF\SURIHVVLRQ7LQNHU6LNNDµOLPLWHGDWWHQWLRQKDVEHHQ
placed directly on the way accounting information has been used by social 
movements in their struggle for a EHWWHUZRUOG¶ Indeed, accounting research has 
traditionally ignored issues like labour rights and social justice, and lack of access to 
accounting information has a long history of disadvantaging employees and unions in 
bargaining situations (Brown and Dillard, 2015; Brown, 2000a).  
To add to this literature, we therefore consider a case where accounting was 
effectively harnessed by a progressive social movement: the campaign to regulate 
child labour and excessive working hours during the nineteenth century British 
industrial revolution, which found political expression in the factory reform 
movement and factory  reform debates. Certain features of this case illustrate aspects 
of accounting hitherto unexplored. Most notably, a social movement that included in 
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its leadership progressive business interests had access to, and was able to use, 
accounting information drawn from business records and practice to overcome the 
UHVLVWDQFHRIRWKHUEXVLQHVVJURXSVWRUHJXODWLRQ7KLVµTURMDQKRUVH¶IXQFWLRQRI
accounting relies on an alignment of interests between working class organizations 
and sections of the elite. Such alignment may of course be temporary, but can result in 
permanent change. So, what motivates the progressive section of the elite to use 
accounting information in this fashion is a significant question. Focusing on 
arguments in contemporary pamphlets and parliamentary committees and debates, 
particularly concerned with cost of production in cotton textile factories, we argue 
that material interest and ideology determine OREE\LVWV¶behaviour and use of 
accounting.    
In our interpretation, the development of productive capital creates  an 
objective  measure for the quantification of cost through accounting, but competing 
agents use accounting subjectively through interpretation, ideology and institutions, 
including the institutions of regulation. Such an approach builds on the 
base/superstructure interpretation of Catchpowle and Smyth (2016), but also implies 
the conclusion of Gallhofer and Haslam (2003, 2006, 2009): that social movements 
can subjectively appropriate accounting information as ostensible fact, to pursue their 
wider objectives. Unlike Gallhofer and Haslam, the paper argues that how factions 
within the elite used accounting, including representation of accounting information 
through the media, reflected their material interests. Catchpowle and Smyth (2016)  
argue that the established hegemony of the capitalist class limits the capacity of social 
movements to use accounting effectively within capitalist social relations, which is 
undoubtedly a general tendency. However, our point of departure is that competing 
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interests within that hegemony can, in some circumstances, provide political levers 
accessible to social movements, enabling such interests to use accounting effectively.  
The combination of factionalism within the hegemony, and the effective use of 
accounting to promote progressive change, raises the question of how these factors 
interrelate. For example if there is factionalism, but one faction, typically the 
regressive faction, monopolizes accounting information, developing any kind of 
counter-narrrative using accounting is impossible. Alternatively, if there is 
factionalism, but both sides have access to accounting, counter-narratives are possible 
and can help underpin the case for progressive change. Contextualising the role of 
accounting in social change can therefore be helpfully supported by the analysis of 
competition between factions, or fractions of capital. Writing at the time of the 
culmination of the factory reform campaign in early 1846, Marx noted: µ7Ke 
ERXUJHRLVLH«GHYHORSVRQO\JUDGXDOO\VSOLWVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHGLYLVLRQRIODbour into 
YDULRXVIUDFWLRQV«VHSDUDWHLQGLYLGXDOVIRUPDFODVVRQO\LQVRIDUDVWKH\KDYHWRFDUU\
on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with 
HDFKRWKHUDVFRPSHWLWRUV¶0DU[	(QJHOV>@: p.82). The quotation is well 
known, and has prompted significant research on the nature of fractionalization (for 
example Davies, 1977, Clarke, 1978) and its consequences for the role of the 
accounting profession in periods of political transition (Catchpowle and Cooper, 
1999).  
A possibility that has thus far not received attention is that such 
fractionalization could occur within the same industry, with rival capitals utilizing 
their business level accounting data differently to promote competing agendas on 
regulation. Political differences between firms in the same industry occur frequently, 
for example oil firms favouring differing degrees of environmental protection 
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legislation or the degree of support for divestment campaigns across financial and 
other institutions. Capital is rarely motivated by pure altruism and such variations, we 
argue, emerge from the social relations of production expressed as alternative 
competitive strategies. In productive industries, the labour process is an important 
component of social relations and can therefore influence business strategy. 
The nineteenth century cotton industry and proposals for its regulation provide 
a useful illustration. At this time, different technologies were employed, such as 
continuous throstle spinning or intermittent mule spinning, leading to alternative 
labour processes and payment systems (Burawoy, 1984). Such variations meant that 
cotton capitalists were faced with different cost functions,  creating the possibility of 
using accounting to support opposing viewpoints towards regulation. An important 
consequence of the use of accounting in this fashion was a substantial setback for the 
laissez faire ideology of some  mill owners, who had argued against regulation.  
The paper thus addresses how the formation of coalitions between fractions of 
capital and classes impacted on the use of accounting and the presentation of 
accounting numbers as supposed fact. In this sense, accounting information is 
implicated in a dialectic of (de)regulation,  resulting in series of compromises 
between competing capitals. As a case of competition between capitals in the same 
industry, factory reform is a useful example of the workings of this dialectic. 
Although accounting was strongly implicated in the political battles over factory 
legislation, historians have thus far examined the factory question largely as a moral 
or ideological issue, without considering accounting evidence in detail. The paper 
analyses this evidence for the first time.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section we 
review the literature on social movements and the use of accounting and the 
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accounting history literature on the state of accounting theory and practice 
immediately before the major pieces of factory legislation (c.1830), to show how this 
historical episode contributes to each. In the third section we then consider the 
historical context of the campaign for factory reform, explaining the competing 
agendas of the two sides of the debates. The fourth section introduces new empirical 
evidence, based on parliamentary debates and committees, contemporary pamphlets 
and business archives, on the use of accounting in the parliamentary debates 
preceding the Factory Acts of 1833 and 1847. The reasons for the divergences in 
presentation of accounting evidence by opposing lobbies are evaluated in a fifth 
discussion section which also draws out implications for more recent and current 
debates. A sixth, final, section draws conclusions. 
 
2. Accounting and social change  
 
2.1. Social movements and accounting 
Using a series of examples, Gallhofer and Haslam (1994, 2003, 2009) have 
demonstrated the importance of the long nineteenth century2 in highlighting the role 
of accounting as part of a wider story of the evolution of modern institutions. They 
suggest that -HUHP\%HQWKDP¶VDFFRXQWLQJUHSUHVHQWHGHPDQFLSDWRU\DFWLYLVPDVSDUW
of a rational, transparent and inclusive public discourse, in the absence of official 
hegemony of publicity, to promote moral behaviour and general well-being. The use 
of accounting by the radical newspaper Forward, showing that Bryant & May could 
afford a wage rise for the striking match girls, illustrates a perceived underlying 
                                                        
2
 The period 1789-1914, as defined by Hobsbawm (1995). 
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neutrality in accounting information that can be appropriated to signify the claims of 
social movements (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). Likewise, in their account of the 
protest movements of Red Clydeside, both conventional and radical socialist 
newspapers engaged similar accounting information to promote their alternative 
capitalist and counter-hegemonic narratives (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2006: p.237, see 
also Amernic, 1988). In these episodes, Gallhofer and Haslam (2006), drawing on 
Stuart Hall, explain that similar events can be portrayed differently because the mass 
media allows them to be signified in different ways. As a result, oppositional 
movements can decode accounting, for example to signify excess profits in support of 
their claims.  
 Industrial relations and collective bargaining cases provide further examples 
of attempts to develop alternative accounting narratives. In some bargaining cases, for 
example the coal industry, accountants have been accepted for the purposes of 
arbitration by both sides, in which intermediaries were trusted with confidential 
information about profits (Bougen, Ogden, and Outram, 1990). Even if such 
DFFRXQWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQLVXQELDVHGLWVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWHQµPD\EHQRPRUHWKDQD
subjHFWLYHDVVHVVPHQWRIXQTXDQWLILDEOHGDWD¶(McBarnet, Weston & Whelan, 1993: 
p.94). For similar reasons, unions and employers may contest evidence on health and 
VDIHW\ULVNVSRVVLEO\ZLWKWKHDVVLVWDQFHRIµRUJDQLFDFFRXQWDQWV¶SUHSDUHGWR
advocate on behalf of vulnerable groups (Brown and Dillard, 2015). To assist 
negotiations, these dialogical approaches might develop counter-accounting or 
information systems, building multiple dimensions of performance (Brown and 
Dillard, 2013). Accounting can also be a means of including employee representatives 
in dialogue with management, although the scope is necessarily limited (Brown, 
2000b). 
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 The risk in all these cases, however, LVWKDWLIDFFRXQWLQJLQGHHGKDVµFODVV
EHORQJLQJQHVV¶DVVXJJHVWHGE\&DWFKSRZOH and Smyth (2016), the ability to decode 
it may be circumscribed via the obfuscations of accounts preparers. For Amernic and 
Craig (2005: p.79), cost information in particular is not clear-cut, leading to 
ambiguous and non-QHXWUDOµWHFKQLFDOVWUDWHJLFDQG WDFWLFDOXVHV«LQFROOHFWLYH
EDUJDLQLQJ¶ Selective and subjective interpretation of accounting information by 
accounts preparers thus FRQVWLWXWHVDµKLGGHQSRZHU¶PDVNHGE\LWVWHFKQRFUDWLF
perception (Hines, 1988: p.257). Carruthers (1995: p.322) suggests that in bargaining 
VLWXDWLRQVDFFRXQWLQJµFDQDEVWUDFWDQGUHGXFHHQRUPRXVVRFLDODQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDO
FRPSOH[LW\GRZQWRDVLQJOHERWWRPOLQH¶,QVLPLODUYHLQ+RSZRRGVXJJHVWV
that accounting is an objectifying force, making precise what would otherwise be 
abstract. The very act of recognising accounting information in a collective bargaining 
situation is to reify capitalist social relations and rationalize its assumptions (Spence 
and Carter, 2011). Accounting was used in such a fashion in the Renold case 
(Bougen, 1994), to keep management holding power over labour and to mask real 
stories about ZRUNHUV¶experiences. 
Challenges to this form of objectification are also difficult for such 
oppositional movements, due to barriers to accessing information. Dominant capital 
can normally resist demands for legislatively enforced information and participatory 
rights and limit the effectiveness of social movements through regulatory capture 
(Brown, 2009). Historical studies have shown that firms have prevailed on regulators 
to limit accounting disclosure, citing the potential for increased conflict between 
capital and labour (Arnold, 1997, Edwards, 1980).  
In general then, where accounting is used in a bargaining situation with labour, 
capital is in a stronger position due to its control over accounting information and 
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accounts preparation. Evaluating the motives of preparers is therefore crucial, raising 
the question of their material and ideological interests. As Catchpowle and Smyth 
(2016: p.223) suggest, instead of being socially constructed, accounting discourse has 
material roots based in the class nature of capitalist society, reflecting the dialectical 
relationship between the economic base (capitalist) and the superstructure (culture, 
language, ideology etc.).  
Social contradictions thus create the  opportunity and motive for campaigners 
to mobilize accounting information in support of their aims.  Such broad demands can 
be part of a µvalue-based¶VRFLDOPRYHPHQW$FFRUGLQJto Smelser (1962 [2011]: 
pp.301-302) such movements challenge the values of capitalism, as distinct from 
µQRUP-RULHQWHG¶PRYHPHQWV7KHODWWHUKDYHthe aim of establishing a norm, or a new 
law, for example agitation for shorter hours in the United States. Based on *UDPVFL¶V
µFRPPRQVHQVHJRRGVHQVH¶FRQWUDGLFWLRQSrnicek and Williams (2015) 
suggest that such demands might constitute alternatiYHVWRKHJHPRQLFµFRPPRQ
VHQVH¶ For example social movements might demand shorter working hours as the 
logical consequence of automation, but at the same time such demands challenge the 
dominant narrative of capitalism. 
 
Whether or not they ultimately challenge 
hegemony, where social movements embrace quantifiable and progressive demands 
EDVHGRQ*UDPVFLDQµJRRGVHQVH¶WKHUHLVDSRWHQWLDOUROHIRUDFFRXQWLQJ (Smyth and 
Whitfield, 2016), for example by highlighting the effects on profit of alterations to the 
labour process or by countering arguments about such effects put forward by 
defenders of the status quo. 
Opportunities for such challenges may be enhanced where social movements 
can access business level accounting information, which in turn may be more likely 
where capital is divided on an issue.  Such divisions might feature conflicts over 
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regulation between capitals, which are motivated accordingly to use accounting to 
serve their competitive interests. Examples include industrial versus finance capital, 
national capital versus transnational capital, or, within the same industry, green versus 
fossil fuel energy companies, seeking to influence subsidy, tax or regulation policies.  
There are competing theories to explain such fracturing, including why, as we 
explore in our case study below, capitals and capitalists may compete with each other 
on policy issues such as working time. Recognising that capitalists can effectively 
EHFRPHµZDUULQJEURWKHUV¶&DWFKSRZOHHWDO., 2004: p.1048; Harman, 1991: p.9),3 the 
µIUDFWLRQDOLVWV¶DUJXHWKDWGLIIHUHQWFDSLWDOV¶SROLWLFDOGHPDQGVFDQUHIOHFWWKHLU
industrial sector or functional base (e.g. manufacturing v finance capital) within the 
economy. Although based on the traditional definition of classes in relation to 
ownership of the means of production, these approaches have been criticized as 
merely analytical and ignoring the fundamental relation between capital and labour 
(Clarke, 1978). Capitals are mutually dependent on each other for resources 
(Catchpowle et al. 2004), or as Marx (1973: p.414QRWHVµ&DSLWDOH[LVWVDQGRQO\FDQ
exist as many capitals, and its self-determination therefore appears as their reciprocal 
interaction with one anotheU¶7KHFDSLWDOUHODWLRQLVDVXPPDU\H[SUHVVLRQIRUWKH
whole nexus of social relations, founded in the production of surplus value, but 
HPERGLHGLQWKHZKROHFLUFXLWRIFDSLWDO¶OHDGLQJWRDGXDOIRUPof social relations of 
capital, i.e. between capitals there is anarchy, within capitals there is despotism 
(Barker, 1991: pp.206-207).  
                                                        
3
 +DUPDQQRWHVWKDWWKHµZDUULQJEURWKHUV¶TXRWHLVDWWULEXWHGWR0DU[+DUPDQ
p.9), but it is impossible to locate in his work (Murray, 2006: p.8). 
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In seeking to establish a dominant postion, certain fractions of capital may 
enter coalitions with other social groups. For example apartheid South Africa 
promoted manufacturing capital as a leading sector through an alliance with a fraction 
of the (white) working class, thereby promoting the interests of capital as a whole 
(Clarke, 1978). Distinct from other cases of alliances between fractions of capital and 
social movements, for example to remove apartheid in South Africa (Catchpowle and 
Cooper, 1999), or cases of dialogic uses of accounting more generally relying on 
alternative accounting and information systems (Brown and Dillard, 2013; Brown and 
Dillard, 2015), collaboration between a social movement and a fraction of capital 
might place accounting information at the disposal of a progressive agenda. Such 
fractions coalesce around political and ideological demands (Davies, 1977), arising 
from the relations of production (Clarke, 1978: p.41).  
For the purposes of our analysis therefore, the motivations of different 
fractions of capital to engage with or oppose a social movement reflect alienation 
within competitive relations of production, but at the same time arise from the same 
underlying processes of production and accumulation of surplus value. Rival groups 
of capitalists thus utilize accounting in conjunction with ideological arguments for the 
purposes of successful competition. These divisions might occur where it is not in the 
interest of all capitalists to follow the same strategy towards the deployment of 
technology and the labour process. There is as a consequence, a material basis for the 
fracturing of the common class interest of capitalists by economic competition.  
We prefer such a conventional Marxist approach for several reasons. First, our 
story is about resistance to accumulation by exploitation as opposed to the 
accumulation by dispossession that has characterized later social movements (Harvey, 
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2003, Catchpowle and Smyth, 2016, p.225).4  Second, resistance to the exploitation of 
workers in cotton factories by demands for shorter hours FRQVWLWXWHGDµJRRGVHQVH¶
counter-QDUUDWLYHWRWKHRVWHQVLEOHµFRPPRQVHQVH¶UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQORQJHUKRXUV
and sufficient profitability. Third, mXFKRI0DU[¶VDQDO\VLVLQKLVFRUHZRUNVZDV
formulated using examples from the cotton industry, including commodity 
production, labour process and the determination of the rate of profit. These 
underlying categories were at the centre of the debates on factory reform, which were 
also referred to extensively by Marx, most comprehensively in his chapter on the 
working day (1976: ch.10).  Finally, the debates pre-dated the general extension of the 
democratic franchise to working class voters by several decades. Methodologies that 
investigate social movements from the standpoint of democratic pluralism (Brown, 
2009; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) although arguably more useful in current contexts 
(Tregidga et al., 2016), are perhaps less so in situations where democracy is 
proscribed. Our case study therefore complements analyses of contemporary social 
movements by focusing directly on the politics of the factory, the labour process and 
the use of accounting by competing factions of the elite. Our findings potentially 
inform other cases of exploitation of labour in the absence of democracy, for example 
textile factories located in dictatorial countries with output contracted to multinational 
corporations (MNCs). Using a nineteenth century case also allows aspects of the 
                                                        
4
 For example, the emergence of minority rights movements in the 1960s. 
Recognising that  such social movements may nonetheless be based on the interests of 
more than one group (Hirst, 1993), more recently movements have developed broader 
programmes and agendas, for example opposition to globalisation, based on the 
material interests of multiple groups (Catchpowle and Smyth, 2016). 
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accounting history of that period to be reassessed. To contextualize the case study that 
follows, a brief review of the literature on the uses, abuses and state of development 
and understanding in accounting and costing at this time is required.  
 
2.2.Early nineteenth century accounting theory and practice 
The most significant contextual questions, in the light of the above review, are the 
extent to which accounting reflected class dominance and the extent of associated 
bias.  ,I:HEHU¶V (1978: pp.91-92) view is accepted, accounting was simply a rational 
tool in the capitalist machine and not subject to persistent error or bias. It follows that 
the capitalist mentality leads to the demand for accurate accounting information 
within the labour process and from business owners (Bryer, 2005). However, these 
links form an ideological basis of class rationality and do not accommodate the 
material processes that might otherwise explain conflicting use of accounting within 
the capitalist class (Toms, 2010). Moreover, according to Brief (1965), the validity of 
management claims in business disputes during the nineteenth century was 
XQGHUPLQHGE\ZLGHVSUHDGµDFFRXQWLQJHUURU¶7RZKDWH[WHQWWKRXJKZHUH%ULHI¶V
claims justified, and how far was nineteenth century accounting practice likely to 
promote the ambiguities in accounting information referred to earlier? 
If treated DVDK\SRWKHVLVWKHµDFFRXQWLQJHUURU¶DUJXPHQWLVSUREOHPDWLFLQ
the sense that its evaluation raises the issue of objective truth. To address this, we 
IROORZ0DU[¶VIRUPXODWLRQRIXVHDQGH[FKDQJHYDOXHDQGDUJXHWKDWDFFRXQWLQJKDV
an underlying objectivity arising from the labour process of value creation. An asset 
thus HPERGLHVDVSHFLILFTXDQWLW\RIODERXUIRUH[DPSOHµDGHILQLWHTXDQWLW\RIODERXU
«KDVEHHQREMHFWLILHGLQWKHFRWWRQ¶0DU[: 296). Value creation through the 
labour process is at the same time a social relation, with the aim of the production of 
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surplus value (Marx, 1976: p.1002) such that the division of such value requires the 
institutional settlement of conflicting claims (Toms and Fleischman, 2015). Market 
price, as distinct from value, in turn represents the crystallization of value as a specific 
quantity of money (Marx, 1976: ch.2). A similar approach can be applied to cost 
categorization and behaviour. Fixed cost then, as a quantity of money, can be fixed in 
an objective sense, i.e. it does not vary at all with a change in output. At the same 
time, whether a cost, for example wages, is fixed or not is determined subjectively by 
social and market institutions, for example the choice to impose piece rates or time 
based wages.  
The question of fixed cost was a crucial aspect of the µDFFRXQWLQJHUURU¶
hypothesis. The so called WKHµIL[HGFRVWSUREOHP¶VXJJHVWHGWKDW whereas accounting 
methods were adequate for domestic production under the putting out system, once 
production had been internalized in factories, there was a subsequent failure to adopt 
suitable accounting treatments for production overheads (Edwards, 1937). Indeed 
Pollard (1965) suggested that costing techniques were largely superfluous in textile 
and related industries due to reliance on market price; a view echoed by Hoskin and 
Macve (1988). They note (p.71) limited application of costing for decision purposes at 
Charlton Mills in Manchester, and by one time employee of Strutt and English émigré 
Samuel Slater, whose costing methods did not differentiate varying costs of labour. 
$QLPSRUWDQWDVSHFWRI%ULHI¶V: p.14) DFFRXQWLQJHUURUZDVµWKHIDLOXUH to 
systematically distinguish between capital and revenue expenditures and the failure to 
SHULRGLFDOO\DOORFDWHWKHRULJLQDOFRVWRIIL[HGDVVHWVWRH[SHQVH¶)DLOXUHZDV
compounded by subjective use of accounting numbers, so that for Hopwood (1987: 
p.215), writing about practices at the pottery manufacturer Wedgwood, µFRVW
UHPDLQHGDQLGHDQRWDIDFW¶:KHUH the functions of accounting are more significant 
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than technical procedures, accounting had to be constructed not merely revealed 
(Hopwood, 1992). In similar vein, Miller and Napier (1993) stressed the need to 
consider meaning and significance attached to calculations, not (just) calculations 
themselves. All of these dimensions of accounting error provided significant potential 
for competing interpretations of accounting by political lobbyists.  
Error and subjectivity did  not, however, obscure genuine progress in the 
theory and practice of accounting. Using the example of steam engine manufacturer, 
Boulton and Watt, in the period 1770-1820, Toms and Fleischman (2015) note that 
relatively sophisticated managerial accounting techniques evolved in response to 
changes in the material base, including the internalization of asset configurations and 
transformation of the labour process. Similarly, for contemporary theorists like 
Babbage, fixed cost was a consequence of mechanization, widely recognized in the 
railway and engineering industries (Wells, 1978: p.61), thus becoming more 
significant with industrialization and the increasing complexity of manufacturing 
(Garner, 1954). Parker (1969) notes that Babbage was the first to make the distinction 
between fixed and variable costs in the literature, but, as Edwards (1989: p.310) 
points out, business practice reflected the distinction much earlier. Boyns and 
Edwards (2013: pp.108, 97, 114) note an awareness of effects on cost of changes in 
cost of production at Keswick copper works c.1600 and that businessmen were aware 
of the importance of differentiating between fixed and variable cost as early as 1740 
citing the case of a production location decision with varying levels of output by the 
Melincryddan works. They also note  linkages made between the scale and cost of 
production in the iron smelting, pottery and Cornish metal industries thereafter during 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century (Edwards, 1989: pp.310-311).  
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 In summary, the literature suggests that before c.1830, business owners were 
well aware of cost accounting techniques, but used accounting information 
subjectively, often reflecting their wider objectives. It is also noteworthy that absence 
of regulation meant that accounting was used almost exclusively for management 
accounting purposes in sole traders and partnerships, with few incentives to 
manipulate the accounts, DVWKHUHZDVQRµRXWVLGHU¶DXGLHQFHIRUDFFRXQWLQJ
information.  Lack of clear rules also meant that in the cotton textile industry, there 
was space for mill owners and social reform campaigners to interpret accounting 
information differently and SUHVHQWLWVXEMHFWLYHO\WRDQLQWHUHVWHGµRXWVLGHU¶DXGLHQFH, 
as they did in the factory reform debates. Extending the above evidence (Wells, 1978, 
Garner, 1954, Toms and Fleischman, 2015), it can be argued that PLOORZQHUV¶
accounting understandings and perspectives were driven by the development of 
productive forces under their control. As economic growth occurs, there are 
opportunities to substitute capital for labour, which will create differences in the 
resource bases of firms within the same industry. Businesses can, for example, vary 
according to capital intensity, product type and range, choice of technology, or 
dependence on certain types of labour and labour processes. In turn, these features 
create the material base for ideological differences and attitudes to regulation. 
Our contention is that both sides amplified accounting error in the factory 
reform debates for political purposes. As suggested by Catchpowle et al. (2004: 
SDFFRXQWDQF\KDVDµ-DQXVIDFHDWRQFHDVRFLDOFDOFXOXVZKLFKFDQDFWDVD
OHYHURIJHQHUDOVRFLDODGYDQFHDQG\HWDOVRDWRRORIFODVVSRZHU¶$FRPPRQO\XVHG
µFRPPRQVHQVH¶DUJXPHQWRIWHQVXSSRUWHGE\DFFRXQWLQJFDOFXODWLRQVZDVDQGVWLOO
is) that regulation would destroy profit and therefore employment in favour of foreign 
competition. Good sense rejoinders to such assertions included the notion that long 
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hours damaged productivity by exhausting workers and reducing their working lives. 
Leonard Horner, the first factory inspector, became increasingly convinced of this 
view, which was reinforced by experiments demonstrating increased productivity in 
shorter working time (Nyland, 1989; Smelser, 2013). 
To illustrate these processes, the remainder of the paper considers the use of 
accounting information by competing interests on the issue of factory reform in the 
19th century British cotton textile industry. The paper uses a range of contemporary 
sources that featured accounting evidence. These consist of pamphlets and short 
books, evidence given in parliament and the surviving accounting records of factory 
owners. The purpose was to investigate how the protagonists used accounting 
evidence to further their arguments, with a particular emphasis on the presentation of 
production costs. Contemporary books and pamphlets were frequently polemics on 
the morality of child labour, but also the consequences of legislation for costs and 
profits, notably Fielden (1836), Ashworth (1837), Greg (1837), Horner (1837), Senior 
(1837), Kenworthy (1842) and Ashley (1844). These standpoints overlapped to some 
degree with further evidence available from minutes of parliamentary inquiries, 
principally the Factories Inquiry Commission (FIC) (BPP, 1833, 1834), but also the 
VXEVHTXHQW)DFWRU\,QVSHFWRUV¶UHSRUWVIRUH[DPSOH%33DQGIXUWKHU
proceedings (BPP, 1846), culminating in the legislation of the ten hour day in 1847. 
Factory reform also occasioned much debate in parliament, recorded in Hansard (for 
example BPP 1844), although not commonly on detailed technical questions of 
accounting. Finally, business archives, specifically the Greg papers (GP) and 
Ashworth papers (AP), have been consulted because they provide detailed accounting 
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information which can be compared to the evidence presented by these entrepreneurs 
to the public and to parliament during the debates.5 
The next section uses these sources along with historical and contemporary 
literature to set out the competing agendas of the protagonists and how and why they 
mobilized accounting evidence. A further section then concentrates on accounting 
evidence specifically to explain how mill owners on either side of the factory debates 
used accounting and cost information to advance their arguments. Through an 
analysis of these competing interests, we can evaluate the extent to which their 
material circumstances and ideology determined their use of accounting information 
about the relationship between fixed costs, the length of the working day and profit. 
6SHFLILFDOO\WKHPDWHULDODVSHFWFRQFHUQVPLOORZQHUV¶XVHRISK\VLFDODVVHWVDQG
organization of the labour process; ideology refers to their political and religious 
orientations. 
 
3. The factory reform debates: Competing agendas and historical context 
Although often set in the context of ruthless labour exploitation, the factory reform 
movement was not a simple conflict between labour and capital. Within the industrial 
bourgeoisie and aristocracy, child labour and working hours were divisive political 
issues by the early 1830s, reflecting rapid industrialization and ineffective earlier 
legislation.6 Consequently a social movement emerged, based on the demand for 
                                                        
5
 Located respectively at Manchester Central Library and the John Rylands Library, 
Manchester. 
6
 3HHO¶VHealth and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802 (42 Geo III c.73) placed in loco 
parentis responsibilities on masters employing orphans, and was widely regarded as 
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shorter working hours. The Short Time Committee, led by John Doherty in 
Manchester, demanded a ten hour day, with associated protection for younger and 
female workers (Robson, 1985), which gained traction with the wider labour 
movement (Kirby & Musson, 1975). However, the short time movement (hereafter 
STM) did not encompass all working class political perspectives. In March 1850, 
Engels (1975: p.99), noted that it provided µDQ excellent meeting JURXQG¶ for 
reactionary classes µWR join forces with the proletariat against the industrial 
ERXUJHRLVLH¶ Engels perhaps had in mind Lord $VKOH\¶V assumption of the leadership 
of the STM in parliament in 1832, with support from Anglicans, landowners and 
some factory owners. However, the involvement of mill owners in the STM also 
reflected a significant split in the industrial bourgeoisie, and prominent supporters of 
regulation, including William Kenworthy and John Fielden, used their ILUPV¶ 
accounting data to assist their case in the later phase of the debate.7  
The laissez-faire lobby (hereafter LFL) consisted exclusively of mill owners, 
and insisted on factory discipline and unregulated hours (Kirby & Musson, 1975; 
Berg, 1982; Clark, 1994). Prominent mill owners in the LFL included Henry and 
                                                        
ineffective (Hutchins & Harrison, 1903, p.17). The Cotton Mills and Factories Act 
1819 (59 Geo. III c.66) outlawed employment of children under 9 and limited the 
working day to 12 hours for children aged 9±16. In 1825 Sir -RKQ&DP+REKRXVH¶V
Bill resulted in a legislated 69 hour week and in 1831 the Labour in Cotton Mills Act, 
1831 (1 & 2 Will. IV c.39) limited the working day to 12 hours for all those under 18, 
and night work to those aged 21 and over. 
7
 John Doherty (1798-1854) trade unionist and factory reformer; Lord Ashley, 
(Anthony Ashley Cooper) Tory MP and 7th Earl of Shaftesbury (1801-1885). 
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Edmund Ashworth, John Pooley, Robert Hyde Greg, Hugh Hornby Birley and 
Holland Hoole, who used accounting information to advance their arguments. 
Following an initial inquiry and report drafted by Michael Sadler MP (BPP, 1832), 
the LFL leaders engineered a new Parliamentary Commission (the Factories Inquiry 
Commission, hereafter FIC) to visit the manufacturing districts and take further 
evidence prior to redrafted legislation (Greg, 1837: p.8). The Great Reform Act of 
1832 enhanced the political power of the manufacturing classes, and the Whig 
(subsequently Liberal) party and Anti Corn Law League represented their interests. 
Accordingly, the dispute over factory reform has been characterized as between the 
interest of Whig, Dissenting, rural water powered mill owners, against Tory, 
Anglican, metropolitan, steam powered mill owners (Marvel, 1977; Nardinelli, 1985). 
However, this literature does not consider by whom and for what purpose accounting 
evidence was used, and is reconsidered in the light of new empirical evidence 
presented below.  
The fixed cost question was at the centre of the ensuing evidence to the FIC 
and associated public debate of 1833. To provide theoretical support to the arguments 
of the LFL for long hours, Oxford economist Nassau Senior (1837) promoted the idea 
WKDWDOOSURILWZDVHDUQHGLQWKHµODVWKRXU¶RIWKHZRUNLQJGD\Accounting was used 
by the LFL in the factory  reform debates to directly support these arguments that a 
high proportion of overhead costs were fixed and had significant effects. The FIC 
VXPPDU\UHSRUW%33SUHIHUUHGWR*UHJ¶VHYLGHQFHRQWKHGLVSURSRUWLRQDWH
reduction in wages that would arise from a reduction in output due to the effects of 
fixed charges. As a consequence, they argued effectively that, in cotton and other 
textile industries, long hours were essential to profitable operation and indeed their 
PLOOV¶VXUYLYDODJDLQVWWKHWKUHDWRIRYHUVHDVFRPSHWLWLRQ 
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+RZHYHU6HQLRU¶VWKHRU\DQGWKHXVHRIDFFRXQWLQJHYLGHQFHLQWKLVIDVKLRQ
was misleading, and a prominent case RIµDFFRXQWLQJHUURU¶,QVRIDUDVIL[HGFRVW
represents a quantity of money that does not vary with output, as noted earlier, 
6HQLRU¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWDOOSURILWLVHDUQHGLQWKHODVWKRXURIWKHZRUNLQJGD\LV
demonstrably false, unless it can be shown that all costs were assumed fixed. 
Assumptions about cost behaviour were therefore crucial to the whole debate. In 
DFFRXQWLQJWHUPVWKHWRWDOGHVWUXFWLRQRIDOOSURILWDVLPSOLHGE\6HQLRU¶VWKHRU\
FRQWDLQHGDQLPSOLFLWµJRRGVHQVH¶FRXQWer argument: that profit would not be 
destroyed by shorter hours insofar as costs were variable and not fixed. Indeed, profit 
could be increased if fixed costs were more than covered by investments enhancing 
labour productivity. Other economists, notably Marx (1976: ch.9, section 3), 
subsequently challenged 6HQLRU¶Varguments along these lines (Nyland, 1989: p.9).  
However misplaced, the accounting evidence to the FIC reflected the views of 
the LFL almost entirely. An important reason was that Ashley, Doherty and the STM 
refused to participate LQZKDWWKH\FDOOHGWKLVµ&RPPLVVLRQIRUWKHSHUSHWXDWLRQRI
LQIDQWLFLGH¶)UDVHU¶V, 1833), because they expected it to whitewash the owners and 
prevent reform (Henriques, 1971: p.8). The STM had good tactical reasons for not 
participating and challenging this evidence. Specifically, the STM were suspicious of 
the composition and process of the FIC. Gray (2002: pp.68-70) notes several reasons. 
6DGOHU¶V&RPPLWWHHRIZKLFKHVWDEOLVKed substantial and credible evidence of 
the degrading nature of the factory system, had been conducted as a public 
parliamentary hearing. In contrast, the FIC was without legal precedent, and the STM 
YLHZHGLWDVDµ6WDU&KDPEHU¶DQGDQLOOHJLWLPDWHH[WHQVion of executive power, 
staffed by Whiggish commissioners acting on behalf of the government, with the 
objective of vilifying the operatives. A boycott was organized, and the 
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Commissioners were frustrated in their attempts to identify and call the STM leaders 
to give evidence. Even so, some operative witnesses to the Sadler Committee were 
compelled to re-testify to the FIC under oath, whereas mill owners were allowed to 
submit written evidence drafted in their own counting houses. Gray (2002: p.71) also 
notes that the most prominent example in the rHSRUWZDV5REHUW+\GH*UHJ¶V
elaborate accounting calculations, as analysed below.   
It is important to note, however, WKDWWKH/)/¶VDFFRXQWLQJHYLGHQFHHYHQDW
this stage, was not entirely unchallenged. John Welsford Cowell, in his capacity as 
FIC committee chair for one of the textile districts, subjected Hoole, Ashworth and 
3RROH\¶VDFFRXQWLQJHYLGHQFHWRFULWLFDOVFUXWLQ\GXULQJWKH),&KHDULQJV and also 
compiled his own lengthy report analysing the cost structures of cotton mills in 
Lancashire and overseas.8 To do so, he conducted a detailed survey of cotton factory 
costs, production and profits. The survey used accounting and other data collected 
independently of the LFL lobby and showed that unit production costs were 
significantly higher overseas and British unit costs much lower. Although an 
LPSUHVVLYHSLHFHRIDFFRXQWLQJDQDO\VLV&RZHOO¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQZDVQXOOLILHGE\WKH
disengagement of the STM from the FIC, such that the spurious arguments of Senior 
and the selective use of accounting evidence by the LFL were sufficient effectively to 
resist change. 
                                                        
8
 John Welsford Cowell (1796-1867, lawyer, Bank of England economist and 
JRYHUQPHQWFRPPLVVLRQHU%33&RZHOO¶V3UHIDFHµ3UHIDFH¶LVDPLVQRPHULI
interpreted here literally or anachronistically; it amounted to full report of 37 pages 
(377-414), including data and detailed calculations. 
  
24 
&RZHOO¶VPLQRULW\UHSRUWZDVignored for the purposes of informing the final 
legislation, but nonetheless reflected the importance of accounting evidence in the 
debates and of assumptions about cost behaviour.  Although legislators had ignored 
&RZHOO¶VFULWLTXHRIWKH/)/in the enacted reform of 1833, it was widely reproduced 
through STM sympathetic media outlets and elsewhere,9 and his conclusions began to 
underpin a groundswell of support for legislation in the 1840s. From then on, the 
arguments of the STM were based on downplaying the level of fixed costs, thereby 
suggesting that shorter hours would not have a catastrophic impact on profit. Their 
case for new legislation in the 1840s could now be supported as much by accounting 
evidence as morality.  
The tactical retreat of the STM after the Sadler Committee influenced the 
outcome of the FIC hearings and the consequent Factory Act of 1833.10 The final FIC 
report accordingly proposed only limited reforms of child labour and inspection. 
Ashley and the STM were forced to surrender their ten hours proposal in parliament, 
at least temporarily (Grant and Ashley Cooper, 1866, p.53).  
                                                        
9
 For example, 0HFKDQLFV¶0DJD]LQH SXEOLVKHGDGLJHVWRI&RZHOO¶VDQDO\VLV
It was also readily assimilated by economists, for example, Carey (1838), Principles 
of Political Economy: p.145. 
10
 Grant and Ashley Cooper (1866: p.53). Factory Act of 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV c.103). 
No children were to work in factories under the age of nine (though by this stage 
numbers were few). The Act also required children under 13 to receive elementary 
schooling for two hours each day. Even so, the Act established a maximum working 
week of 48 hours for those aged 9 to 13, limited to eight hours a day, and for children 
between 13 and 18 it was limited to 12 hours daily.  
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Although a defeat for the STM, the 1833 Act was not an outright victory for 
the LFL either. It was underpinned by Benthamite utilitarian principles, and sought to 
protect children (as non-free agents) based on administrative centralization and a 
professional system of inspection (Thomas, 1948: pp.46-48), potentially providing a 
new avenue for scrutiny of the financial affairs of the cotton mills. Consequently, the 
1833 hearings were only the beginning of further arguments over accounting and 
costs of production. In the 1830s Horner, a prominent Benthamite, was appointed lead 
factory inspector and therefore responsible for the implementation of the 1833 Act 
(Martin, 1969: p.438).11 His interventions were the subject of much criticism from the 
LFL, particularly from Greg and Senior (Greg, 1837; Senior, 1837). Greg, being 
µIRUHPRVW in this movement of importing children from the agricultural GLVWULFWV¶ 
was potentially an important target of +RUQHU¶V scrutiny. Greg, along with the 
Ashworth brothers, led the opposition to the inspection regime and the threat of new 
legislation (Grant & Ashley Cooper, 1866: p.57).  
Ashley proposed a new ten hours Bill in 1844 and, for the first time, the STM 
used accounting evidence from mill owners within the movement to support their 
position in Parliament. The LFL, including the Ashworth brothers, undertook similar 
calculations, focused on costs of production in their own business accounts. In his 
pamphlet Kenworthy (1842) detailed the effects of reduced working time on 
                                                        
11
 The FIC was dominated by Benthamites. The central commissioners of the FIC 
were Edwin Chadwick, who chaired the Commission and drafted the Bill, which 
QDWXUDOO\HPERGLHGPRVWRIWKH),&¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV0DUYHOS 
Thomas Southwood Smith and Thomas Tooke, all friends and disciples of Bentham 
(Henriques, 1971: p.9; Thomas, 1948: p.46). 
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production costs that were later reproduced by Fielden in his parliamentary campaign 
(BPP, 1844: q.1236). Fielden, like Ashworth, could have used cost and profit data 
from his own firm, but relied instead on the calculations that had already achieved 
wider circulation via .HQZRUWK\¶V pamphlet. A speech by Ashley in 1844 used 
examples based on more comprehensive data, including a spinning establishment 
comparable to earlier examples fielded by Greg, Birley and Hoole, Pooley and the 
Ashworths. This time the debate was resolved mostly in favour of the STM with a 
new Factory Act in 1847 that legislated for a ten hour day,12 suggesting the value of 
accounting evidence when utilized as a counter-narrative by progressive interests. 
As the above review has made clear, the issue of cost behaviour, which relied 
on accounting evidence, was at the centre of the debates and evolution of regulation 
on child labour and working time. That said, much of the literature on factory 
legislation has been concerned hitherto with disputes and apparent misrepresentations 
over factory working conditions (Kirby & Musson, 1975: p.396) and the ethics and 
regulation of Victorian employment practices, particularly the treatment of child 
workers (for example, Hutchins & Harrison, 1903; Robson, 1985; Humphries, 2010), 
not with claims and counter-claims about relative profits of private firms in the 
industry. The unanswered question is how and with what motivations did textile mill 
owners use accounting evidence to support their arguments in favour of or against 
regulation? Such a question is significant, as there has been no systematic 
investigation of how accounting was used to inform these debates, and the extent to 
which accounting numbers influenced the timing and impact of regulation from the 
point of view of the rival groups of mill owners. The next section introduces new 
                                                        
12
 Factories Act 1847, 10 &11 Vict. c.29. 
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empirical evidence on the motivations, purposes and effectiveness of the uses of 
accounting by the rival lobby groups. 
 
4. Factory reform and accounting 
 
4.1. LFL: Motivations and accounting in the 1833 debates 
A key argument in the economic and social history literature, as noted earlier, was 
that religious or political affiliation determined the attitudes of the two sides in the 
factory reform debates. For those mill owners that used accounting evidence to 
support their case, this is not, however, a sufficient explanation. It is noteworthy that 
the leaders of the LFL comprised Anglican Tories (Birley, Pooley) and dissenting 
Whigs (Hoole, Greg, the Ashworth Brothers). All were, however, strongly connected 
to business networks in Manchester that shared and promoted the individualist laissez 
faire ideology, including the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, the Mechanics 
Institute and the Anti-Corn Law League (Prentice, 1851: pp.428-431; Somerville, 
1853, Rose, 1986, Boyson, 1970, Mosley, 2013). Hoole was a leading figure in the 
Anti-Corn Law League (Prentice, 1851: p.200), and took over the firm of Philips & 
/HHLQ+RZH6LU*HRUJH3KLOLSV+RROH¶VSUHGHFHVVRUDW3KLOLSV	/HH
and founder of the Manchester Exchange and a political Whig, was described as the 
unofficial MP for Manchester (Brown, 1996). Through this network, Greg and 
$VKZRUWKFROODERUDWHGZLWK6HQLRUZKRVHµODVWKRXU¶DUJXPHQWZDVDOLJQHGZLWKGDWD
IURP$VKZRUWK¶VEXVLQHVVDFFRXQWV%33: p.1104).  
Individualism and laissez faire then, rather than a common religious tradition, 
was the ideology that united the LFL as a significant fraction of capital with a 
hegemonic project.  It found its expression in ostensible philanthropic approaches to 
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labour management. Such argumHQWVDOORZHG3KLOLSVWRUHVLVW3HHO¶VHDUOLHUDWWHPSWV
at factory legislation, arguing that it undermined the voluntary improvements in 
working conditions enacted by mill owners, which at Philips & Lee included a 
contributory insurance scheme (Brown, 1996: pp.68, 77-78). At Quarry Bank Mill, 
Greg actively promoted education (Rose, 1986: p.107) and spent large amounts in the 
1830s and 1840s to provide high standard cottages and accommodation at low rents, 
so that although wages were low, living standards were high, resulting in low labour 
turnover (Rose, 1986: p.117). Like the Unitarian Gregs, the Ashworths made major 
investments in housing for their employees (Boyson, 1970: p.119). The Ashworths 
were Quakers and attached great importance to education, which meant that they did 
not employ apprentices or children under the age of nine and were therefore 
unaffected by earlier factory legislation (Boyson, 1970: pp.85, 159-160).   
Such philanthropic motives reflected the material resource base of the leading 
LFL businesses. Quarry Bank Mill was at a remote water-powered location in 
Cheshire, and relied on the parish apprentice system, thereby creating a high 
dependency on child labour. Greg therefore needed to offer good conditions to attract 
workers and prevent apprentices from truanting. As a consequence, Quarry Bank 
became a self-contained factory colony with few threats from outside agitation (Rose, 
1986: p.105).  
In these respects, the Ashworth brothers had much in common with Greg. 
When opening their new factory at Egerton in 1833, they faced a major labour 
shortage, fearing emigration of workers if business was lost to foreign competition 
(Ashworth, 1837: p. 29). Because they were ideologically opposed to labour 
organization, the Ashworths confronted and stood down a wave of bitter labour unrest 
including in 1830 strikes, riots and violence over rates on the new machines, and, as a 
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consequence excluded workers to prevent trade union organization (Boyson, 1970: 
pp.143-146; 148-149). These measures compounded the labour shortage, so that 
instead of recruiting locally, the Ashworths joined with Greg to recruit pauperized 
southern, largely agricultural, labourers. Skilled labour in particular was in short 
supply and required a long period of training. In 1834 and 1835 AVKZRUWK¶VPLOOV
stood idle for want of labour (Boyson, 1970: pp.194, 196). A weaving shed was built 
at New Eagley in 1839, which absorbed some handloom weavers, but Ashworth was 
criticized nonetheless by Fielden and others in 1843 for not employing enough of 
them (Boyson, 1970: pp.197-198). Labour confrontation also increased the 
$VKZRUWKV¶GHSHQGHQFHRQORFDOPDJLVWUDWHVIRUVXSSRUWDQGWKH\GLGQRWZLVKWR
undermine their standing in this respect if they themselves risked prosecution for 
factory legislation violations (Boyson, 1970, pp.147, 167). 
To summarize the LFL perspective, Greg and the Ashworths, faced with 
labour shortages, needed to attract and retain skilled workers, even if in part the skills 
were, for Greg at least, those unique to small children who could work underneath 
machines. They also believed in moral improvement and education as well as high 
standard housing. These considerations meant fixed capital investment over and 
above basic factory buildings, which would tend to promote social stability but limit 
the net return, and increase the risk, on their investment. For these reasons, the LFL 
tended to exaggerate fixed costs and the effects of legislation on business profitability, 
but such exaggerations would to some extent also have been seen as necessary to 
reflect the wider risk to their business model.  
 
Table 1 about here 
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As a consequence, when using accounting evidence in support of their 
arguments, the LFL presented a consistent and pessimistic line on their costs of 
production, especially the burden of fixed expenses and the risks faced by their 
enterprises.13 To provide a comparison and benchmark for these claims, table 1 sets 
RXWWKHLPSOLHGIL[HGFRVWSHUOERI\DUQSURGXFWLRQEDVHGRQWKHPLOORZQHUV¶
assumptions made about which costs should be included in this category. The main 
categories of cost are itemized in each case. Cases are listed in approximate 
chronological order following the course of the debates in the 1830s and 1840s. 
According to their FIC evidence, LFL estimates of fixed cost per lb averaged 
1.516d (table 1), much higher than subsequent estimates by the STM and by Horner. 
7KHSULPDU\SXUSRVHRI*UHJ¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQRIFRVWVZDVWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKH
leveraging effect of fixed costs on wages and profits. Greg used extracts from his 
accounting data from one year only, the year to September 1832, from which he 
implied that all listed non-wage costs (total £6510, or 1.782d per lb) were fixed.14 He 
stated that: µ,Q coarse spinning the fixed charges and contingencies amount to as 
much as the wages; and if the former remained the same and price stationary, the 
reduction on the latter must be GRXEOH¶ (BPP, 1833, p.782). He also stated the total 
                                                        
13
 Greg gave evidence to the second Lancashire committee of the FIC, chaired by 
Edward Carleton Tufnell (1806-1886, government commissioner) whilst Birley, 
Hoole, Edmund Ashworth and Pooley gave evidence to the first committee, chaired 
by Cowell.  
14
 BPP (1833, p.784 [D2]) showed wages costs as £6,800. *3µ6WDWHPHQWRIVXQNDQG
IORDWLQJFDSLWDO¶ 
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costs of production (excluding raw material)15 as £13,401 for an output of 880,000lbs 
per annum and suggested that $VKOH\¶V bill would reduce these figures to £12,730 and 
727,000lbs respectively, being a difference of 0.55d per lb, which µis equal to a good 
SURILW¶ (BPP, 1833: p.782). These relationships implied a fixed cost of £10,044, or 
2.739d per lb, that the proportion of fixed to total expenses was c.71%, and that a 
substantial proportion of wages were also fixed. However, not all the categories of 
expense included by Greg were obviously fixed. The sundry and contingent expenses 
necessarily included some categories of variable cost, for example selling and 
distribution costs, a point acknowledged by Greg when referring to higher costs faced 
when selling to more distant markets (BPP, 1833: p.785). There was also an argument 
put by Cowell (BPP, 1833: p.679), later echoed by the STM, that interest on the 
floating part of capital16 could be considered a variable cost, and this emerged as an 
important difference in the assumptions of the protagonists, returned to below. 
&RZHOO¶V challenges aside, the LFL was free to use accounting evidence to 
present a one sided and pessimistic view of the costs, profits and risks of their 
businesses. For example, *UHJ¶V figures presented to the FIC also included 
depreciation (sinking fund). *UHJ¶V actual accounts, as revealed in the archival 
evidence, showed no evidence of depreciation being applied.17 Nonetheless, he 
                                                        
15
 Throughout the debates, production costs referred to wages and overheads, and 
excluded material costs (i.e. the costs of raw cotton), 
16
 Floating capital was a commonly used term in contemporary accounts, to 
distinguish from fixed capital, and therefore corresponds to working capital. 
17
 The available figures in the Quarry Bank Mill accounts (GP, Partnership Book) end 
in March 1831.  
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GHVFULEHGWKHGHSUHFLDWLRQSROLF\DVµILYHSHUFHQWDQQXDOO\RQRXUEXLOGLQJVZDWHU-
wheel and engLQHDQGWHQSHUFHQWDQQXDOO\RQRXUVPDOOHUPDFKLQHU\¶ZKLFKFRYHUHG
µQRWRQO\ZHDUDQGWHDUEXWDOVR«GHWHULRUDWLRQDULVLQJRXWRIQHZLQYHQWLRQV¶%33
1833, pp. 784-785, 780). Indeed, other LFL witnesses (for example Jackson) argued 
for high depreciation charges that remained constant regardless of use, because the 
rate of technical progress tended to increase obsolescence rates of µVXQN FDSLWDO¶ (ie 
fixed capital) investments (BPP, 1833, pp.777 & 782).18  
Further LFL representations, meanwhile, made points about high fixed cost, 
for example +RROH¶V evidence. His figures showed that µ«WKH charge for rent, SRRU¶V 
(sic) rates and fixed VDODULHV¶ accounted for 1.250d (table 1) out of total expenses of 
5.5d (BPP, 1833, pp.729-730), implying fixed costs were 22.7% of total expenses. 
+RROH¶V figures differ in part from *UHJ¶V because they were based on an urban 
Manchester steam-powered mill (rather than a water-powered mill).  The former 
incurred specific variable expenses, such as coal costs. Even using these relatively 
conservative assumptions, Hoole was able to demonstrate that the loss in wages due to 
shortened working hours across the whole industry would be µDW least £1,000,000 per 
DQQXP¶ on a loss of output µDW the disposal of our foreign FRPSHWLWRUV¶ of 
40,000,000lbs. The operatives understood this, according to Hoole, and for that reason 
opposed restrictions on working time (BPP, 1833: pp.729-730). Hoole and *UHJ¶V 
evidence demonstrated a point which recurred consistently throughout the debates: 
that high fixed costs would lead to disproportionate reductions in wages and damage 
the profits of the mill owners in the event of further restrictions on working hours. 
                                                        
18
 See also Marx (1976, p.528, notes 64 and 70), quoting authorities from the 1860s 
(The Times, 26th Nov., 1862; BPP, 1862, 31st Oct., p.19)  
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Greg was also aware of counter arguments about the impact of shorter 
working hours, mainly from Cowell, based on the benefits of new technology. He 
discounted the effects of increased efficiency from technical improvements, for 
example extensions to spinning mule width, arguing that costs tended to rise in 
proportion (Greg, 1837: pp.101-102).19 Further, he argued that competition prevented 
price rises being passed onto consumers, suggesting that an increased price was 
attended by diminished consumption in a greater ratio than the rise of price (BPP, 
1833: p.785). These arguments stressing the elasticity of demand and fragility of 
profit helped Greg underpin his case that the Bill presented a serious threat to his 
business and were further supported by arguments about the cost of production that  
continued into the 1840s.  
Although biased, *UHJ¶Varguments were effective, and his evidence was 
crucial to the outcome in terms of the 1833 Act. Tufnell, as chair of one of the FIC 
committees for LancashireXVHG*UHJ¶VEXVLQHVVDFFRXQWVWRsupport his own 
conclusion that restrictions on hours would undermine the industry. Tufnell (BPP, 
1834: pp.186) cited the accounts of an anonymous business (1829-1833) as evidence 
of low profitability in the trade as a whole, in concluding on the dangers of 
restrictions on hours. On checking the archives, the figures for 1829-1831 correspond 
exactly to those in the private ledgers of Quarry Bank Mill.20 The evidence therefore 
                                                        
19
 Other witnesses (Hall, Rowbotham and Gaskell) supported the view that newer 
machines would mitigate the consequences of reduced hours (BPP, 1833: p.678). 
20
 GP, Partnership Book. Other features described by Tufnell correspond to those of 
Quarry Bank: total capital £40,000, numbers employed, use of throstle spindles (BPP, 
1834, p.490). 
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shows that Greg and Tufnell not only shared the same view, but also, by sharing 
private accounting information, were in close collusion.  
Moreover, the accounting evidence used was highly selective. For example 
Greg could have shown Tufnell the accounts of his Bury Mill, which was much more 
profitable than Quarry Bank in the corresponding period, or indeed the consolidated 
accounts of all the mills owned by the family partnership, which showed their vast 
accumulated wealth.21 Table 2 compares the figures cited by Tufnell for Quarry Bank 
with the profits from other Greg family owned mills. As the table shows, absolute 
profits and net returns on capital were higher at Caton and much higher at Lancaster 
and Bury than at Quarry Bank. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The marginal profits shown by Tufnell in his representation of the Quarry 
Bank accounts were after deduction of all expenses. These included, legitimately 
perhaps, given the remote rural location of the mill, expenses for mill cottages. 
Significant rent and interest charges were also deducted. However, these charges were 
set by the partnership, and appropriated by the partners as profits in their capital 
accounts, even though the accounts also added them into production cost.22  
 
Figure 1 about here 
                                                        
21
 The total invested wealth of the Greg family in 1824 across a portfolio of assets 
including cotton mills was £223,000 (GP, Statement of assets and liabilities). 
22
 GP, Partnership Book. 
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Given the evident subjectivity of depreciation, rent and interest, consistency is 
UHTXLUHGIRUFRPSDULVRQ,Q)LJXUHWKHVHYHQ\HDUV¶UHWXUQVSULRUWRWKH),&DUH
recalculated using the partnership books of account23 in conjunction with the net 
profit figures SURYLGHGLQ7XIQHOO¶VDFFRXQW%33: 1834, p.490) but applying the 
depreciation policy that Greg told the committee was used, notwithstanding the 
absence of such charges from the actual accounts. Such adjustments are required due 
to the discrepancy between the business accounts in the archives and those presented 
in Parliament. Tufnell noted the rent was reduced from an annual equivalent of £4,096 
to £2,500 in the accounts of September 1832 (BPP: 1834, p.490). However, before 
that date, the net profit figures used by Tufnell were arrived at after the deduction of 
the much higher rent charges previously applied. Figure 1 therefore shows rates of 
profit calculated using consistent charges for rent and depreciation, and shows that in 
general profits were higher than the atypical year of 1832, which was a relatively low 
SRLQWLQWKHWUDGHF\FOH,QRWKHUZRUGV*UHJ¶VHYLGHQFHZDVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\
omission, and highly selective use of accounting data. Nonetheless, the choice of the 
1832 accounts, for Quarry Bank only, proved influential in assisting the committee 
FKDLU¶VGHFLVLRQWRUHMHFWWKHSURSRVDOIRUWKHWHQ hour day. Although Cowell made 
coherent counter-DUJXPHQWVWKHVHZHUHXQGHUPLQHGE\WKH670¶VQRQ-participation 
in the FIC. As a consequence, collusion between the LFL and regulator based around 
a single accounting narrative, marked a significant defeat for the STM.  
The behaviour of the LFL in securing sympathetic legislation in the 1833 Act 
is reflective of the common case of regulatory capture and bargaining dominance 
                                                        
23
 GP, Partnership Book. 
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based on a single accounting narrative. Crucial to this outcome was access to the 
business accounts of the leading advocates. Such evidence could be manipulated 
through collusion with regulators and counter narratives thereby marginalized. The 
FIC Report referred directly to the financial arguments of the LFL mill owners in 
summarizing its findings. 24  Notwithstanding wider factionalism, the monopolization 
of accounting information by the LFL allowed a one-sided, pessimistic, view of costs 
and profits to be presented to significant effect, sufficient to prevent decisive 
regulatory change. The 1833 Act appeared therefore as a triumph for the LFL 
SUHGLFDWHGRQWKHµFODVVEHORQJLQHVV¶RIDFFRXQWLQJLQIRUPDWLRQ  
 
4.2. STM: Motivations and accounting in the 1840s debates 
The STM regarded the 1833 Act as a temporary setback. Although the Act instituted 
the factory inspection regime and limited the employment of children aged 9 to 13, 
the universal ten hour day remained unrealized, and they continued their campaign 
accordingly. In this new phase, the STM made increasing and effective use of 
accounting to counter the LFL arguments that had been so influential in framing the 
1833 Act.  
Indeed, the STM had good reasons, based on ideology and economic 
circumstances, to argue that potential legislation would not increase costs or damage 
profits. Kenworthy represented a typical advocate for the STM, being based in the 
weaving district of Blackburn, in an innovative steam-powered firm, and forming part 
of a circle of Tory Anglicans (Lewis, 2002: pp.276, 389). Fielden, by contrast, was a 
XWLOLWDULDQDQGUDGLFDODQGVKDUHG:LOOLDP&REEHWW¶VKDWUHGRIWKHSROLWLFDOHFRQRPLVWV
                                                        
24
 BPP (1833), summary report, pp.43, 45-46. 
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(Stephen, 1912: p.174), albeit for different reasons than the Ashleyite Tories (Croft, 
1994: p.9) and Anglican Tories like Kenworthy. He was strongly influenced by 
5REHUW2ZHQ¶VOHFWXULQJWRXUVRIWKH1RUWKLQDQGRQWKHWKHPHRIVRFLDO
co-operation (Royle, 1974: p.48), and had been persuaded that reduced hours could be 
worked such that the employer could still make a handsome profit (Croft, 1994: 
pp.24, 35).  
Fielden and Kenworthy, like Greg and Ashworth, had major issues with labour 
and capital resources, but with different consequences. Power weaving looms had 
lagged the automation of spinning, but by 1826 their diffusion was regarded by many 
as inevitable, and as introductions accelerated and handloom weavers were displaced, 
there was a wave of rioting and machine breaking in the weaving districts (Bythell, 
1969: p.75).  The TodmordHQDUHDZKLFK)LHOGHQ¶VEXVLQHVVHVLQFUHDVLQJO\
dominated, was highly dependent on weaving (Croft, 1994: p.37) and in the 1820s 
UDSLGGLVSODFHPHQWRIKDQGORRPZHDYHUVZHQWKDQGLQKDQGZLWK)LHOGHQ¶V
substantial investment in power looms. There were major riots in 1826 and attacks on 
machinery were a real concern (Croft, 1994: pp.8-9). $IWHU)LHOGHQ¶VWaterside mill 
was established in 1829 (Anon, 1884: p.420), he was forced to turn away scores of 
weavers each week looking for work.  
Fielden relied on KenwRUWK\¶VDFFRXQWLQJGDWDWRSUHVHQWWKH670FDVHLQ
parliament in 1844 and, in certain crucial respects, their circumstances were similar. 
Blackburn, like Todmorden, was a weaving centre also threatened with social disorder 
arising from the displacement of the handloom weavers. Kenworthy was a noted 
inventor of a loom automation feature, condemned as a µORFDOHYLO¶likely to incur 
µPDFKLQHEUHDNHUVZUDWK¶ (MacLeod, 2007: p.159). He therefore believed that 
innovation and invention would stimulate supply, but because working hours were 
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long, had instead only increased drudgery, and as a result WKHµOLYHVRILQYHQWRUVKDYH
EHHQHQGDQJHUHGLQPDQ\LQVWDQFHV¶ (Kenworthy, 1842: p.15). The problems of 
surplus labour and instability faced by Fielden and Kenworthy contrasted therefore 
with the labour shortages and contained social stability at the Quarry Bank and the 
Ashworth mills.  
Reflecting these material circumstances in terms of labour availability and 
labour process, Fielden (1836: p.64) thus argued that a Ten Hours bill would create 
employment for handloom weavers without significant loss of profit. Like Owen 
(Parker, 2014: p.640), the Fielden mills already had a long tradition of working ten 
hour days (Fielden, 1836: p.32). Legislated shorter time, Fielden argued, would 
overcome another problem for the industry: increases in price due to fixed raw cotton 
supply from America against increased consumption of yarn in England with 
associated higher cost, speculative activity and market disequilibrium (Fielden, 1836: 
pp.57-58, 59-64).  
To summarize, as the 670¶V business leaders, Kenworthy and Fielden both 
wanted the benefits of technical progress, but feared technological unemployment and 
its social consequences. Their ideologies made legislation acceptable, as they believed 
it would create social stability in their localities and equilibrium in markets. Their 
attitude to regulation and attachment to a progressive social movement for shorter 
hours therefore reflected a desire for a µOHYHO playing ILHOG¶ such that competitors 
could be forced to adopt similar employment practices and thereby not undermine 
market equilibrium. For these reasons, the STM stressed the low proportion of fixed 
costs to the total costs of production and the consequential marginal effects of 
legislation on costs and profits in the 1842-1844 debates on further factory reform. 
The involvement of these influential entrepreneurs on the side of the STM meant that 
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the LFL faction now lost the monopoly of accounting information that had been 
decisive in 1833. The STM now used its own figures to significant effect on the 
ensuing debates. Figures given by Ashley in his speech of 1844 and implied by 
Kenworthy in his 1842 pamphlet25 were important ingredients of this counter-
narrative. These suggested an average fixed cost of 0.297d per lb. In contrast the 
equivalent number for the LFL arguments was 1.001d per lb (table 1). An important 
reason for the difference was the STM¶V argument that depreciation, and interest on 
the floating part of capital, should be costs that varied with production, and according 
to this assumption should be left out of the calculation altogether.26 Fielden (BPP, 
1844: q.1236), also using evidence from .HQZRUWK\¶V (1842) pamphlet, argued, as 
Cowell had done in the 1833 debates, that interest on the floating capital was a 
variable cost of production, since the reduced output following from a shorter 
working week would lead to a corresponding reduction in that part of the capital. 
Birley and +RROH¶V 1833 evidence was consistent with such an interpretation and only 
included rent, rates, insurance and fixed salaries in their fixed cost per lb figure of 
1.25d, ignoring depreciation altogether (table 1).  
Kenworthy¶V evidence now suggested that fixed costs were lower than 
anything implied by the LFL previously. In contrast to their earlier evidence, he 
argued that all non-wage expenses totalled 1.25d per lb, which may have equally been 
                                                        
25
 Law (1995: pp.63-VXJJHVWVWKDWEDVHGRQKLVLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI)LHOGHQ¶V
DFFRXQWV.HQZRUWK\¶VILJXUHVZHUHSUREDEO\PRUHUHOLDEOHWKDQ$VKOH\¶V 
26
 Ashley (1844, p.7) used pro-rata reductions in wear and tear allowance in 
WDEXODWLRQV.HQZRUWK\SµDPRXQWRIZHDUDQGWHDU«ZLOOEHOHVVHQHGLQ
WKHVDPHSURSRUWLRQ¶DOVRFLWHGLQDVSHHFKE\)LHOGHQ%33T.1236). 
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an understatement. The implied fixed costs element of these expenses was even less, 
according to .HQZRUWK\¶V scenario. On the basis of these assumptions, he went on to 
argue that the net effect of reducing production hours by the fraction of 60/69 would 
be to raise unit costs in spinning, including labour, by 3/8d per lb. To be consistent 
with this outcome and stated costs, the fixed cost element of the total non-raw 
material cost per lb would be 0.300d per lb (table 1). $VKOH\¶V assumption, that the 
only truly fixed cost was interest on fixed capital, produced a similar result (0.293d 
per lb, table 1), implying the 670¶V lobbying position was to argue essentially that 
almost all costs were variable. In parliament Fielden (BPP, 1844: q.1236) used 
.HQZRUWK\¶V figures, which also showed the increase in the cost of woven cloth 
amounted to 1/4d per yard to undermine the pessimistic forecasts of the LFL mill 
owners of the consequences of legislation: µ$UH we so near ruin, that an advance of 
one farthing per yard on our cotton cloth would irrevocably seal our fate? If so, how 
important an element of national prosperity, is the labour of these poor people! How 
praiseworthy is their exemplary patience under their complicated VXIIHULQJV¶ Fielden 
thus used .HQZRUWK\¶V accounting evidence to great polemical effect.  
In summary, as the data in table 1 show, the STM and LFL adopted very 
different interpretations of cost behaviour in making their arguments about regulation. 
Neither is likely to represent an entirely neutral perspective, and it is therefore worth 
considering if either can be validated using additional evidence. Two sources are used 
for this purpose: first, the calculations of the factory inspector, Horner, and second, 
the detailed accounts and actual costs of one of the mills that featured in the dispute. 
Horner, whose role as chief Factory Inspector required a substantial degree of 
public neutrality, also provided him with direct access to business level accounting 
information. To begin with, he was concerned that a lack of transparency made 
  
41 
enforcement difficult, for example falsification of age in the records of child workers 
(Wing, 1837, Henriques, 1971). Horner had written to Senior:  
µ7KH statements of people engaged in trade, as to their profits, especially 
where a complicated process of manufacture makes it difficult for us to verify 
them, must be received with great caution: their object always is to show for 
how little they work. They take a large margin, in their estimates of the cost of 
production, for tear and wear, of machinery, &c. bad debts, and sundry 
possible contingencies; and they prudently take care to keep themselves quite 
safe in their FDOFXODWLRQV¶ (Horner, 1837: pp.31-32). 
Whilst making such criticisms, Horner carried out his role, with fairness and rigour, 
strongly defending the autonomy of the process (Martin, 1969: pp.429-430).  To this 
end, he accumulated accounting evidence to examine mill owners¶FODLPV in detail. 
Examples are shown in table 1. His calculations suggested a fixed cost figure closer to 
1d per lb, for the two most comparable mills (shown in table 1; 1.254d and 0.763d 
respectively). As table 1 shows, his figures were much nearer to the STM than the 
LFL. As a result, Horner believed that profits were higher and costs lower than the 
LFL claimed, and that legislation would not damage profits, as workers would be 
more productive. Consequently, Horner gradually became more convinced of the 
STM case. He took an interest in experiments at Preston, which showed that changes 
in hours did not result in output reductions (Nyland, 1989: p.10). The results 
influenced him to work alongside Ashley in 1844 for the new Ten Hours Bill 
(Henriques, 1971: p.16). Accounting evidence in the eyes of an objective observer 
like Horner, who was also under pressure to be seen to be objective, was therefore 
crucial in undermining the case against further regulation. 
 +RUQHU¶V calculations lend further credibility to the STM case, but what of the 
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accuracy of the LFL counter claims based on their own accounts?  The Ashworth 
EURWKHUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVZHUHPDGHRQDVHSDUDWHVKHHWLQRQHRIWKHLUOHGJHUVDQGZHUH
LQWHQGHGDVDUHVSRQVHWR.HQZRUWK\¶VSDPSKOHW$34XDUWHUO\6WRFN
$FFRXQWVµ&DOFXODWLRQVIRU7HQ+RXUV%LOO¶S.111; Kenworthy, 1842: pp.11-12). The 
striking feature of the LFL evidence was again the high level of fixed cost in relation 
to output and the assumption that all the costs specified, including interest and 
GHSUHFLDWLRQUHPDLQHGIL[HGIRUVFHQDULRVVKRZLQJWKHHIIHFWVRI$VKOH\¶V%LOOThe 
two calculations were based on average fixed costs taken from survey returns of large 
PDQXIDFWXUHUVDQGLQFOXGHGLQDµSXEOLVKHGDGGUHVVRIPDQXIDFWXUHUV¶DQGIURP
$VKZRUWK¶VRZQDFFRXQWVIRU1HZ(DJOH\PLOOVKRZQLQWKHOHGJHUDVWKHµ2OG
0LOO¶$FFording to these calculations, fixed costs were the equivalent of 3.887d per 
OE8VLQJWDEOHIRUFRPSDULVRQWKH670ILJXUHZDVGDQG+RUQHU¶VILJXUHZDV
1.001d.  
In view of the differences between the STM and LFL JURXSV¶ figures, 
investigating the costs listed in the Ashworth archives provides a possible resolution. 
In their private ledgers, the Ashworth accounts provided a wealth of detailed 
expenditure analysis at high levels of disaggregation, so that a comparison can be 
made between what would normally be considered to be fixed and variable costs and 
the claims made by the competing interests, including the Ashworths themselves. The 
document allows a more detailed level of analysis in terms of cost breakdown than 
any of the publicly available calculations used in the debates. 
Some guidance can be gained from the treatment of costs in accounts of cotton 
mills and other businesses during this period. 2YHUKHDGVLQFOXGHGµ:HDUDQGWHDUUHQW
HWF¶DWWKH&DPEULDQ6PHOWLQJDQG&RDO&RPSDQ\LQ(Jones, 1985: p.104).  In 
FRWWRQWH[WLOHVDWµ&KDUOWRQ¶0LOOVJHQHUDOH[SHQVHVLQFOXGHGFRVWRIµFRQWDLQHUV
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FDUWLQJSDFNLQJDGYHUWLVLQJOHJDOH[SHQVHVWD[HVDQG/RQGRQVDOHVDOORZDQFH¶
(Stone, 1973: p.77). Chorlton Mills general expenses for 1840 consisted of 
depreciation, interest, bad debts and selling expenses, carting, packing, rates and 
taxes.27 $W*UHJ¶V4XDUU\%DQN0LOOFRQWLQJHQWH[SHQVHVLQFOXGHGZDJHVDQGµVXQGU\
LQYRLFHV¶WRZKLFKLQWHUHVWUHQWVHOOLQJH[SHQVHVEDGGHEWVDQGGLVFRXQWVZere 
added, along with charges for the school and chapel.28 From March 1825 onwards the 
format changed such that wages, interest on capital, rent, sundries and selling 
expenses were again itemized, but also calculated on a cost per lb basis. Identifying 
fixed expenses from within these groupings would not be easy, and, in a separate 
calculation by Greg in 1831, all costs except wages were treated as fixed.29 
Using these examples of typical industry practice at the time to inform our 
judgements, the result of our analysis of the Ashworth accounts is also shown in table 
1, based on the following assumptions. All costs associated with goods in (e.g. cotton 
carriage and brokerage) and production processes (carding through to spinning) are 
assumed to be volume-based and therefore variable costs. Because the Ashworth 
factories paid workers by the piece (Huberman, 1996: p.90), production wages can be 
accurately classified as costs varying directly with output. Overlookers (supervisors), 
warehouse costs, salaries and travelling, and HQJLQHHUV¶ salaries, although probably 
involving some variable element, are assumed to be 100% fixed. Interest on floating 
                                                        
27
 Chorlton Mills, Birley and Co. Mill ledger, p.147. Stone (1973) and the archive 
LQGH[UHIHUWRµ&KDUOWRQ¶EXWGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIWKHDUFKLYHVXJJHVWVWKHFRUUHFW
attribution is Chorlton.  
28
 GP, Partnership accounts, 1824-1825. 
29
 GP, Statement of sunk and floating capital 
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capital and depreciation on machinery is assumed to be variable and interest on fixed 
capital and depreciation on land and buildings assumed fixed. On this basis, the 
Ashworth accounts tend to confirm +RUQHU¶V view, with annual fixed cost of just over 
£2,500, the equivalent of 1.856 per lb, much less than the £4,872 stated in the 
µ&DOFXODWLRQV for a Ten Hours %LOO¶ document and the £6,334 per year suggested by 
Boyson.30 These detailed figures provide greater accuracy when compared with the 
aggregations into more generic cost categories used in the parliamentary debates by 
either side.31 (YLGHQFHIURP$VKZRUWK¶VRZQDFFRXQWVWKHUHIRUHVHHPVWRVXSSRUW
)LHOGHQ¶V%33: q.1236) assertion of marginal impacts on unit production costs. 
Although the effect on production cost was small, the potential consequence 
for profit was larger, and may explain the behaviour of the LFL mill owners. Tufnell 
had used his analysis of Quarry Bank to make the point about profit variability (BPP, 
1834: p.490). Based on the figures in the Ashworth accounts, a reduction of working 
time from 69 to 60 hours (13.0%), even with the relatively low proportions of fixed 
costs calculated in table 1, would still result in a 25.1% reduction in profit.32 In other 
                                                        
30
 Boyson (1970: p.59) refers to a calculation by Henry Ashworth, showing that 
overheads were such in a 52,000 spindle mill that it did not pay to stop it until losses 
exceeded £6,334 a year. See also BPP (1846: pp.336-337). 
31
 Excluding labour and raw material, Ashley and Greg used only four cost categories 
(Ashley, 1844: p.9; BPP 1833, p.784). 
32
 The categories of fixed cost referred to in table 1 amount to 1.856d per lb. The 
figure corresponds to an annual equivalent total fixed cost of £2,502 and an output of 
323,664lbs of yarn yielding a net profit of £2,712. If output is reduced by the fraction 
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words, risk, arising from the operating leverage of fixed capital investment was as 
important, if not more important, than the actual levels of cost and profit, and may 
have coloured the attitudes of the LFL leaders accordingly.  
In summary, the historical records show the crucial role of accounting 
evidence in the second phase of the debates, in particular how the STM was able to 
use firm level access to accounting information to undermine the dominance of the 
LFL after 1833. The focus of the challenge was cost behaviour, and views on the 
subject were strongly affected by variations in the cost and cost variability impacts of 
technology and labour process, which explained the fractionalization of capital. Such 
fractionalization created the opportunity for the effective use of accounting 
information as a counter-narrative to the high fixed cost story that had been 
established unchallenged in 1833, adding an economic case to the moral arguments 
previously made in isolation. A convincing case based on a higher variable cost 
proportion demonstrated that substantial costs could be avoided if restrictions on 
working time were imposed and that sufficient profit would be protected to justify 
further innovation and investment. As it turned out, the final passage of the Act in 
1847 and the ten hour restriction did not depress profit rates and the continued 
expansion of the cotton industry thereafter mitigated downside risk and confirmed the 
empirical truth of the STM position, whilst ensuring the fears of the LFL were 
unrealized.33  
                                                        
60/69 (13.0%), reflecting the proposed reduction in hours, the profit falls to £2,032, or 
a reduction of 25.1% (AP, Quarterly Stock Book, November 1845). 
33
 Return on capital for sub-samples of cotton firms was 6.575% in the period 1836-
1847 compared to 11.848% in the period 1849-1860. 
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5. Discussion: The uses and abuses of accounting  
In summary, both sides of the factory reform debate had access to accounting 
information and clearly understood the nature and scale of fixed cost and how it 
affected projected profit. These understandings are manifested in the significance of 
the differences in estimates made and the corresponding convenience of such 
estimates to the broader arguments of either side. The debates in 1833 and the 1840s 
were both characterized by the fractionalization of mill owning capital, but only in the 
1840s was accounting used effectively to construct a counter-narrative. 
Accounting was influential in framing the 1833 Act, albeit on the basis of 
impressionistic and monopolistic use of the data by the LFL. Some, like Greg, made 
effective use of accounting as publicity by selecting helpful interpretations and 
suppressing others. The counter arguments by Cowell were ignored by the regulators 
but not in the wider debate, and these accounting interpretations of production costs 
strongly informed subsequent arguments about the $FW¶V inadequacies, leading to the 
subsequent passing of the 1847 Act and the effective µYLFWRU\¶ of the STM.  
The tendency to suggest higher fixed cost or vice versa at all stages of the 
debates was primarily a function of responses to changes in technology and its 
relationship to local employment conditions. The LFL, who stressed low profits and 
overstated costs, were motivated by the threat of foreign competition, perceived 
business risk and shortages of skilled labour. The STM, who understated costs, were 
motivated by threats to innovation, risk arising from market disequilibrium, and social 
unrest arising from surplus labour. In turn, these production and labour process related 
pressures were reinforced by the ideological positions adopted on either side of the 
debate. The examples of the selective use and subjective interpretations of accounting 
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evidence which we have uncovered in relation to the factory reform debate thus 
provide an explanation of lobbying behaviour that goes beyond the binary 
distinctions, in terms of religion and geographical location, offered thus far in the 
wider social and economic history literature (Marvel, 1977; Nardinelli, 1985). The 
manner in which accounting information was used and presented by both sides of this 
19th century social reform conflict, in the context of the wider ideology and 
institutions forming the background of the debate, supports the contention of 
Gallhofer and Haslam (2006) that accounting can be decoded in different ways to 
align with the wider objectives of a particular lobby group, and enhances the evidence 
base of examples of such use of accounting information during the long nineteenth  
century.   
As the evidence makes clear, accounting was characterized more by WKHµ-DQXV
IDFH¶QRWLRQRI&DWFKSRZOHHWDOWKDQE\%ULHI¶VµDFFRXQWLQJHUURU¶
Both sides of the factory reform debate had good understanding of cost classification 
and behaviour and realized that the outcome was highly dependent on their associated 
assumptions. Because of the presence of mill owners on both sides of the debate, after 
1833, neither side could monopolize the accounting function as a source of 
information. The likelihood is, therefore, that true fixed cost of production lay 
VRPHZKHUHLQEHWZHHQWKHSURWDJRQLVWV¶FODLPV 
The evidence does suggest, however, that the good sense arguments of the 
STM were more accurate, and that its leaders had less pressure or incentive to 
exaggerate their claims. 7KHHSLWKHWHDUQHGE\)LHOGHQµKRQHVW-RKQ¶6WHSKHQ
174), would appear to be justified, or at least not compromized, by his use of 
accounting. Horner¶VBenthamite agenda based on greater state-driven transparency 
through inspection, including scrutiny of accounts, underpinned WKH670¶VSRVLWLRQ
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In particular, he strived for rigorous and systematic comparability of mill costs, such 
that he could use his position to obtain empirical evidence to independently scrutinize 
the claims of the LFL. Indeed, +RUQHU¶VUROHLQWKLVHSLVRGHLVFRPSDUDEOHWR
%HQWKDP¶VHDUOLHUDGYRFDF\RIDFFRXQWLQJ, along the lines suggested by Gallhofer and 
Haslam (1994). 
As a consequence, WKH/)/¶VDFFRXQWLQJDUJXPHQWVZHUHLQVXIILFLHQWWR
permanently stem the regulatory tide. Theoretically, the claim of the LFL rested in its 
PRVWH[WUHPHIRUPRI6HQLRU¶VIODZHGQRWLRQRIWKHµODVWKRXU¶, a world in which all 
costs were fixed costs. In effect, substantial proportions of cotton textile mill running 
costs at this time were variable. The LFL mills faced greater sunk costs, in part as a 
consequence of their investment in factory communities, which in turn reflected their 
dependence on child labour.  
Arguably there was more at stake for the operatives in the STM, as long hours 
threatened their personal welfare. Although the STM mill owners shared these 
concerns, their motives were, like the LFL, grounded in their underlying business 
circumstances, reflected in their use of accounting evidence. A crucial element of the 
670¶VVWUDWHJ\DUWLFXODWHGE\)LHOGHQZDVWKDWEHFDXVHIL[HGFRVWZDVVR
insignificant, and the threat to profit of shorter hours correspondingly reduced, the 
moral gains from regulated hours were all the more significant.  
To summarize the accounting evidence, the material resources of the LFL and 
670PLOORZQHUV¶EXVLQHVVHVFUHDWHGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRXVHDFFRXQWLQJWRVXSSRUW
ideologies that in turn promoted a suitable regulatory outcome. The successful use of 
accounts in 1833 by the LFL staved off the ten hour day for fourteen years, but the 
subsequent mobilization of accounts by the STM and the new inspection regime led to 
its final realization. It is unlikely that this success would have been achieved as 
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quickly or with the same degree by relying on moral arguments alone, without the use 
of accounting evidence by the STM after 1833.  
The case also illustrates some moral arguments, which have wider resonances. 
The LFL mill owners¶ provision of benefits for operatives such as housing and 
education, however basic, was designed to head off the threat of government factory 
inspection. In the general case, there would be a corresponding incentive, particularly 
in highly competitive industries, to ensure that similar practices were adopted by the 
whole industry (Jenkins, 2001). However, this would only be the case where such 
provision is by a leading firm based on genuine reputation, and there is little evidence 
that the LFL made any attempt to campaign for wider industry adoption of their 
business methods. Indeed, as %XURZR\¶V (1984, pp.253-260) comparative analysis 
illustrates, the µFRPSDQ\ VWDWH¶ model (analogous to the Quarry Bank Mill 
community) declined during the first half of the nineteenth century. The outcome was 
unsurprising given that the motivation of the LFL leaders was primarily to avoid 
legislative interference in what they considered matters of their purely individual 
discretion.  
These attitudes have more recent parallels. Jenkins (2001: pp.8-9), referring to 
large MNCs, suggests that they may adopt voluntary codes of conduct to pre-empt 
external regulatory pressure. Jenkins refers to the examples of the US textile 
LQGXVWU\¶V consideration of the Clean Clothes Campaign34 as a means of potentially 
                                                        
34
 These principles were developed from the Clean Clothes Campaign, which 
originated in the Netherlands in 1992 and spread rapidly in Europe, being 
subsequently adopted by International Labour Organization (Ascoly and Zeldenrust, 
2013). 
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avoiding intrusive regulatory scrutiny and the more general adoption by US firms of 
the µ6XOOLYDQ 3ULQFLSOHV¶ as a method of doing business in apartheid South Africa 
without being forced into a boycott.  The motivations here, of pre-emption, 
correspond closely to those of the LFL mill owners. 
The enduring division of opinion within the industry also explains why the 
progressive employers attached to the STM chose not to advocate a voluntary code. 
Notwithstanding the voluntary adoption of shorter hours in his factories, Fielden 
(1836) strongly believed that regulation was the only way to achieve a uniform ethical 
outcome and a µlevel playing field¶ for competing firms, and the STM accounting 
calculations showed that this was consistent with a reasonable profit. Part of the 
motivation was thus to avoid ethical firms being undercut by competitors. 
 Like the STM, examples of other social movements show that a section of the 
elite might have competitive reasons for offering support. There are similarities with 
the campaign to abolish slavery. In Britain, this notably involved some members of 
the Greg family, even though much of their earlier fortune had been made in the 
plantations (Seekers, 2013, ch.3). The irony was not lost on campaigners for shorter 
hours in cotton factories, like Sadler and Oastler, who used the notion of µwhite 
slavery¶ to expose the consequences of long working hours in the cotton mills 
(Waller, 2005: pp.8, 292). Living wage campaigns that emerged in a number of US 
cities in the 1990s built coalitions that also included some business owners who 
favoured paying good wages and did not wish to be undercut by less scrupulous 
competitors (Jenkins, 2001; Luce 2002). In South Africa during apartheid, assistance 
given to poor whites and Afrikaner capital underpinned a new business elite in the 
inter-war years (Clarke, 1978; Uppal 2014).
 
Subsequently, as the economic costs of 
preserving apartheid began to hinder capital accumulation, white national and 
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international capital negotiated an alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) 
leadership (Iheduru, 2004), and thereby using accounting calculations to impose a 
privatization agenda, whilst ostensibly promoting social progress through Black 
Economic Empowerment, and to undermine the case for divestment from apartheid 
(Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999; Neu and Taylor, 1996).  
In summary, although there are circumstances where fractions of capital have 
aligned with progressive causes, in some cases accounting has been being used to 
frustrate their wider objectives whilst offering partial concessions. The case of the 
STM illustrates how an alliance with a fraction of capital afforded privileged access to 
accounting information, which, when used effectively to construct a counter-narrative, 
could be instrumental in promoting the social movement¶s ultimate success. As the 
contrasting campaigns of 1833 and the 1840s reveal, fractionalization in itself was 
insufficient to create the conditions for such success. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Divisions in the elite resulted in differential use and interpretation of accounting 
information as a function of the strategies and associated material interests of the 
relevant fractions of capital.  In the factory reform debates, the adopted ideological 
positions of the fractions also underpinned their use of accounting, which played a 
pivotal role in the wider debates. The consequence was that the narrative of long 
working hours being essential to profits, backed by ideological laissez faire, was 
challenged by the STM on the basis of contrary accounting evidence.   
Counterfactually, had the industry been organized around identical 
technologies and labour process, rather than splitting into fractions, the cotton 
capitalists could have acted as a single class interest, using a unified accounting 
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narrative, and the outcome may well have been different. Similarly, had the STM not 
used the accounting µTrojan horse¶ of sympathetic mill owners to establish a 
competing accounting narrative, and relied solely on moral force arguments, they 
might have been less persuasive. Under these circumstances, WKH/)/¶Vresistance to 
regulation based on exaggerated claims about fixed costs would have been more 
effective through control of the production and associated narrative of accounting 
information.The differing outcomes in 1833 and the 1840s tend to support this view. 
The LFL was allowed to monopolize the accounting evidence in 1833, but this was 
decisively contested in the 1840s by the STM.  
7KHH[DPSOHRIIDFWRU\UHIRUPLOOXVWUDWHVWKDWµFODVVEHORQJLQJQHVV¶RI
accounting, whilst an important tool for the emasculation of labour in the general and 
in other specific cases (Catchpowle and Smyth, 2016), can be suspended, for material 
reasons based on sectional divisions within capital. Ideology is nonetheless crucial, so 
that whilst utilitarian arguments were used to justify regulation supported by one set 
of financial claims, laissez faire was used to resist it, supported by a different set of 
financial claims. As the evidence shows, the former were nearer the truth in 
accounting terms and the consequences were the defeat of laissez faire and the 
transformation of the demands of a social movement into an evolving, and contested, 
structure of regulation.  
Strong rhetoric was used on both sides, particularly on the moral and health 
consequences of factory work, which has been dealt with in the general and social 
history literature. The economic arguments, which drew extensively on accounting 
evidence, have been dealt with in detail above, but without embracing full analyses of 
the rhetorical discourses associated with each side. These could be the subjects of 
further investigation.  
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The role of accounting in debates over the length of the working day and the 
effects on profitability in other contexts is an area for further research. Today, as in 
the nineteenth century, businesses differ in terms of their orientation to capital-
intensive fixed cost investment or cheap labour based sweatshop production. In an age 
of reducing regulation and rising inequality, these variables assume greater 
significance, which accounting analysis can powerfully illuminate, to the extent that 
the class belongingness of accounting and the associated bias can be overcome.  
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Table 1: Representations of fixed cost in the Factory Act debates 
 
 
Fixed 
cost 
d/lb 
Costs included  
1833 
Anti-regulation 
 
 
Birley and Hoole (FIC) 1.250 Rent, rates, insurance, fixed salaries 
Greg (FIC) 1.782 Rent, rates, taxes, interest on capital, sinking fund, 
contingencies of carriage, coal &c 
Average 1.516  
  
 
1842-1844 
 
 
Pro-regulation 
 
 
Ashley (speech) 0.293 Interest on fixed capital 
Kenworthy (pamphlet) 0.300 Expenses, interest of capital, wear and tear, depreciation of 
machinery (total 1.25d), fixed proportion corresponds to 
proportion of establishment costs that would need to be 
fixed for a 3/8d increase in total cost combined with a 
reduction in output in the proportion 60/69 
Average 0.297  
   
Horner 
 
 
First example (report), 
cotton spinning mill at  
Manchester ** 
1.254 Rent, taxes, rates, interest on fixed capital, depreciation of 
machinery, fuel to maintain proper temperature, wages and 
salaries of engine man, stoker, managers clerks & others not 
discharged during stoppages, watchman and labourer, 
insurance, interest on floating capital not invested, interest 
on stock of cotton, yarn and materials  
Fourth example (report), a 
cotton spinning mill in 
Bolton** 
0.763 Interest on buildings, engines, boilers and machinery, 
deterioration of the same, manager overlookers and 
bookkeepers salaries, rates, taxes, insurance. 
 
 
Anti-regulation 
1.001  
Ashworth (ledger) 3.781 Taxes, insurance, salaried servants, wear and tear, interest on 
capital 
Address of Manufacturers 
(ledger) 
3.993 µ)L[HGFKDUJHVWDNHQRQWKHXVXDODXWKRULW\¶ 
Average 3.887  
  
 
Other 
 
 
Ashworth accounts  
(ledger) *** 
1.856 Rents, rates and taxes, depreciation, interest on fixed capital, 
insurance, (50% of: engineers wages, salaries and travelling 
expenses, overlookers and warehouse, incidental and stable 
expenses).  
  
 
Sources: Birley and Hoole, BPP (1833), 729-730 [D1]; Greg BPP (1833),  782-784 [D2]; Greg 
accounts estimate, GP Partnership Book; Ashley (1844); Kenworthy (1842)  11-12; Ashworth, AP, 
4XDUWHUO\6WRFN%RRNµ2OG0LOO¶FDOFXODWLRQV$GGUHVVRI0DQXIDFWXUHUV$34XDUWHUO\6WRFN%RRN
µ&DOFXODWLRQVIRUDWHQKRXUVELOO¶+RUQHU%33pp.79-82; Ashworth accounts, AP, Quarterly 
Stock Book, November 1845. 
 
Notes:* Component elements not specified. For consistency with the source document cost per lb is 
based on dividing fixed charges by output in lbs for a £100,000 mill producing medium yarn counts. ** 
The first and fourth examples were used because they were spinning only establishments, therefore 
corresponding more closely to the comparative examples in the table and had sufficient data. *** The 
November 1845 quarter is chosen because it appears opposite the Kenworthy calculations in the ledger. 
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Table 2: Net profits and returns at Greg family mills, 1829-1833 
 
 
Year 
 
Quarry 
Bank Caton* Lancaster Bury 
 
 
£ £ £ £ 
1829 March -661 
 
3396 2041 
 
September 147 
 
-350 1578 
  
-514 1666 3046 3619 
1830 March 113 
 
-167 2301 
 
September 161 
 
1241 2591 
  
274 -2613 1074 4892 
1831 March -406 
 
2624 3695 
 
September -1589 
 
4076 4839 
  
-1995 2340 6700 8534 
1832 March 414 
 
3916 4370 
 
September -1012 
 
1619 2142 
  
-598 2034 5535 6512 
1833 March -1688 1159.5 473 908 
Average net profit 
 
-1004.67 1019.22 3739.56 5436.67 
Total capital 
 
44000 17000 45000 62000 
Average net return on 
capital 
 
-2.28% 6.00% 8.31% 8.77% 
 
 
  
Sources: Quarry Bank figures from Tufnell, BPP 1834, p.490; Caton, Lancaster 
and Bury from GP, Partnership Accounts, Caton mill, 1819-1841; Capital taken 
from FIC, 1833, p.785 and GP, Statement of sunk and floating capital. 
 
Notes: *Annual data only available for Caton mill.   
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Figure 1 
Return on capital: Quarry Bank Mill 
 
 
 
Sources: 1827-1833 and average 1827-33 calculated from GP Partnership book, and 
Tufnell, BPP 1834: 490. 
 
Note: Return on capital calculated using net profit plus interest and rent minus 
depreciation divided by total assets minus third party liabilities.  
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